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Using Family Partnerships and Refuting IRS Challenges 
 
I. Introduction 
This article intends to highlight the AICPA's position concerning the legitimate 
use of family partnerships. In particular, the AICPA takes exception with the 
Internal Revenue Service's ("Service's") refusal to recognize for transfer tax 
purposes the validity of many family partnership's under examination. In 
setting a framework for this discussion, we will examine the development of 
the family partnership as well as the major cases and laws which have focused 
on their transfer tax ramifications. We will then discuss the Service's current 
position, where it is appropriate and how it is being used to discourage 
practitioners from using the family partnership structure. Finally, we will rebut 
the technical basis for the Service's blanket challenge to family partnerships 
and suggest some guidelines for structuring family partnerships to minimize the 
potential for IRS challenge. 
II. Historical Development of Family Partnerships 
The use of family partnerships started back in the mid-1960s but really became 
popular in the mid-1970s. Prior to then, business and investment assets were 
held largely in corporations rather than partnerships. This was largely due to 
two factors. First, the law governing the formation and operation of 
corporations as compared to partnerships is far better understood by most 
attorneys. To a limited extent, this remains true today. Thus, absent other 
compelling reasons, a client's attorney typically urged the formation of a 
corporation rather than a partnership. Second, corporate income tax rates were 
significantly less than individual rates making the corporate structure the 
preferred structure for income tax deferral. Beginning in 1976, the spread 
between individual and corporate income tax rates narrowed markedly making 
partnerships and single level taxation far more attractive. Of equal significance, 
the 1986 Act brought the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine and eliminated 
the ability to liquidate a corporation tax free and avoid double level taxation. 
After 1986, the clearly preferred choice of entity for holding any business or 
investment became the limited partnership if for no other reason than income 
tax considerations. The adoption of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act by 
most states made the laws governing limited partnerships doing business in 
multiple states relatively similar and understandable. In addition, to their single 
level income taxation, limited partnerships are attractive entities because of: 
A. limited liability for most partners, particularly if the sole general partner 
is a corporation; 
B. very flexible equity structure; 
C. both formation and liquidation is largely tax-free; 
D. individual owners can be redeemed largely tax-free; 
E. partnerships terms and provisions are flexible and can be changed by the 
partners as circumstances change; 
F. limited partnerships serve as trust substitutes; 
G. limited partnerships provide significant creditor protection. Limited 
partnership interests are seldom attached; they only provide creditors the 
limited right of an assignee; 
H. limited partnership interests are attractive assets to gift since they are 
generally excluded from consideration in marital settlements and the 
ease with which they can be transferred; 
I. use of limited partnerships avoid multi-state probate if real estate is 
owned in more than one jurisdiction; 
J. avoid division of assets upon death of the holder of the partnership 
interest; 
K. allows synergies in the management of the partnership's assets which are 
achievable only by consolidating financial wealth in one large common 
pot; 
L. maintain family control of assets held by the partnership; 
M. minimal capital requirement; and 
N. partnerships are generally not subject to state franchise taxes. 
There are numerous other reasons for combining and holding business and 
investment assets in a limited partnership. 
One offsetting feature of a limited partnership to its holders is the fair market 
value of the underlying assets may be greater than the fair market value of the 
corresponding partnership interests. This is a clear negative to holding assets in 
partnership solution, particularly if the individual must rely on their personal 
balance in order to obtain credit. However, from a transfer tax perspective, the 
dampening of value is advantageous. This reduction in the value of the limited 
interests is largely due to the existence of marketability and minority interest 
discounts which exist when a limited partnership interest is valued in the 
marketplace. Since the standard for valuing property in general for both gift 
and estate tax purposes is the value that property would be sold between an 
arms-length buyer and seller, neither being under a compulsion to sell or buy, 
and both with a reasonable knowledge of the underlying facts. It is also critical 
to note that for transfer tax purposes fair market value is the price at which 
property would be sold to a hypothetical third party, not a strategic buyer or an 
individual who would gain voting control by the acquisition of the transferred 
interest. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with holding assets in a partnership 
rather than owning them directly, even though the former will almost in every 
instance, produce a lower transfer tax value. In addition to income tax and 
transfer tax considerations, partnerships possess numerous other nontax 
characteristics which make them ideal structures for holding wealth whether 
active or passive, and for transferring partial interests in that same wealth to 
other individuals. 
Over the years, the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Treasury have long 
opposed the existence of large discounts in valuing limited partnership interests 
in the context of the transfers between family members. Throughout the '70s 
and '80s this opposition was focused on disallowing minority interest discounts 
in all transfers between family members where the family possessed effective 
control of the underlying limited partnership. The underlying theory espoused 
by the government was that all members of the family would act in concert; 
thus, each member of the family would be deemed to have the benefit of voting 
control with respect to the underlying limited partnership, thereby making each 
family transferor or transferee a controlling partner of the partnership. The 
government would deny most minority discounts with respect to the transfer of 
closely held limited partnership interests. This theory has been extensively 
litigated. Among the cases dealing with this issue are Estate of Bright v. U.S., 
658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir., 1981); Estate of Andrews v. Comm., 79 TC 938 
(1982); Ward v. Comm., 87 TC 78 (1986); Popstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th 
Cir., 1982); Estate of Lee v. Comm., 69 TC 60 (1978), nonacq. 1980-2 CB 2. 
Finally, after repeatedly raising this argument and losing, the Service in Rev. 
Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 CB 202 acquiesced with the Courts' conclusion that 
minority discounts in addition to marketability discounts were applicable in the 
context of transfers of limited partnership interests between family members. 
Having conceded the existence of a minority discount in the context of an 
interfamily transfer, partitioners generally believed the Service was left with 
litigating the magnitude of such discount. 
Concurrent with these valuation challenges, the Service was also attacking two 
uses of family limited partnerships which were tailored to cap or reduce the 
transfer tax of the senior generation. In Estate of John G. Boykin, 53 TCM 345 
(1987), the government attempted to challenge the classic estate freeze1 by 
arguing that the retention of deferred income interest is tantamount to the 
retention of a proportionate share of corporate income, thereby requiring 
inclusion of the entire business in the estate of holder of the preferred interest. 
(This technique was available to both partnerships and corporations.) The Court 
ruled in favor of the taxpayer and against the Service, noting that the rights of 
shareholders to receive dividends are established by the corporate documents 
that govern the rights of the shares under applicable state law. Shareholders 
were not entitled to any dividends except to the extent the company's board of 
directors approved the payment of dividends. Since the decedent possessed no 
voting control, the underlying value of the corporation was not included in the 
decedent's estate. The principle is equally applicable to limited partnerships. 
The Service also challenged the taxpayer's failure to exercise a conversion right 
from a noncumulative, relatively low yielding preferred to a common stock 
interest in Elizabeth W. Snyder, 93 TC 529 (1989). In this particular case, the 
taxpayer created a freeze structure with a noncumulative preferred interest 
which was convertible into common stock. While the corporation generated 
little cashflow, its underlying assets appreciated significantly. The government 
asserted that the taxpayer should have exercised their conversion rights and 
exchanged the preferred interest for a common interest, and imputed a gift to 
the extent that having done so would have enhanced the value of the senior 
generation's equity position. The Court refused to extend the principles 
of Dickman v. U.S., 465 U.S. 30 (1984), and equate the failure to convert a 
noncurrently yielding preferred interest to a common equity interest when the 
children hold common equity interests to failing to charge interest on loans to 
your family. The Court rightly refused to substitute its judgment concerning 
whether to exercise a conversion right for the sound business judgment of the 
taxpayer and ruled against the Service. 
In addition to attacking the freeze transaction, the Service also attempted to 
attack the use of lapsing liquidation rights. In Harrison v. Comm., 52 T.C.M. 
1306 (1987), the government challenged a valuation of a taxpayer's limited 
partnership interest which as of the moment of death was illiquid, 
nonmarketable and could not be put back to the partnership. The taxpayer 
possessed a very large limited partnership interest and a small general 
partnership interest. The partnership was formed a few months prior to the 
taxpayer's death. While the taxpayer was alive, the taxpayer as a general partner 
could liquidate the partnership. However, under state law, upon death, the 
taxpayer ceased to be a general partner and could require only its general 
partnership interest to be redeemed by the partnership. While the taxpayer was 
alive, he could control the liquidation of both the general and limited 
partnership interest; however, at death, only the very small general partnership 
interest was liquid. The government argued that the liquidation rights and the 
related value which existed upon formation of the partnership but disappeared 
upon the taxpayer's death, should not escape taxation but should be included in 
the value of the taxpayer's estate. The Court disagreed with the Service and 
noted that the estate tax applies only to property whose value is determined at 
the moment of death and passes from the decedent's estate to its intended 
beneficiaries. In Harrison, the partnership interest was illiquid and 
nonmarketable at the moment of death. 
III. Chapter 14 
After a seemingly unbroken stream of judicial setbacks, Treasury and the 
Service decided to turn to legislation to cure what they perceived to be were 
abusive corporate and partnership structures from a transfer tax perspective. 
Congress, in 1990, enacted Chapter 14 of the Code, introducing §§ 2701-2704. 
Their structure and intent is relatively simple. Section 2701 is entitled, Special 
Valuation Rules in Case of Transfers of Certain Interests in Corporations or 
Partnerships, § 2702 is entitled Special Valuation Rules in Case of Transfers of 
Interests in Trusts; § 2703 is entitled, Certain Rights and Restrictions 
Disregarded and, § 2704 is entitled, Treatment of Certain Lapsing Rights and 
Restrictions. In general, the Senate Committee report describes the bill as 
modifying, "the valuation of specifically retained rights in corporations and 
partnerships; the valuation of split temporal interests in property; effect of 
buy/sell agreements and options upon value; and the transfer tax consequences 
of lapsing rights…" In other words, § 2701 is meant to repeal the results in 
both Boykin and Snyder. Section 2703 was meant to deal with potential abuses 
involving buy/sell agreements and options and § 2704 unabashedly attempted 
to overturn the result in Harrison. What is of most significance is the legislative 
history is void of any discussion of cases dealing with minority or marketability 
discounts and, on more than one occasion, the legislative history specifically 
states that the bill is not intended to effect minority or other discounts available 
under existing law. 
IV. The Service's Current Assault on Discounts Applicable to Limited Partnership 
Interests 
Bolstered by their success in the Estate of Murphy v. Comm., TCM 1990-472 
and Estate of Cidulka v. Comm., TCM 1996-149, the Service has effectively 
made a policy decision to challenge the validity of closely-held partnerships for 
transfer tax purposes. This has taken the form of potential litigation such 
as Estate of Elaine Smith White v. Comm., Docket #14412-97,2 several letter 
rulings have been issued denying discounts for transfers of limited partnership 
interests, PLRs 9719006, 9723009, 9725002, 9725018, 9730004, 9735003, 
9735043 and 9736004, and probably most troubling is a widespread audit 
program among gift tax agents where no discounts are being accepted with 
respect to the transfer of any closely-held partnership interest, with all 
meaningful negotiations are directed to the national office of the IRS. There are 
three broad theories for supporting the Service's current assault. The first is that 
the formation of a closely-held partnership by definition runs afoul of § 2703. 
Alternatively, the Service also argues that § 2704(b) will apply to the transfer. 
Finally, if Chapter 14 does not produce the desired result, there is a final appeal 
under the rationale of Estate of Murphy that the transfer of a partnership 
interest rather than the underlying asset is merely a device for the transfer of 
wealth to the natural objects of the transferor's bounty. 
Section 2703 provides as follows: 
"(a) General Rule - for purposes of this subtitle, the value of any 
property shall be determined without regard to (1) any 
option, agreement or other right to acquire or use the property at a price 
less than the fair market value of the property, or (2) any restriction on 
the right to sell or use the property." 
The Service interprets this Code section to say that the typical family 
partnership, in and of itself, is a restriction on the right of the owners to sell or 
use the value of the underlying property held by the partnership or, conversely, 
is an "agreement" limiting the ability of the partners to acquire or use the 
partnership's underlying property at a price less than the fair market value. In 
support of this position, the Service quotes the Senate Committee reports to the 
1990 Act which created Chapter 14. In particular, in language related to § 2703, 
they rely on the following sentences; "these requirements apply to any 
restriction, however created. For example, they apply to restrictions explicit in 
a capital structure of the partnership or contained in a partnership agreement, 
articles of incorporation or corporate bylaws or a shareholder's agreement." The 
Service makes the simple argument that to the extent a partner, whether limited 
or general, is precluded from accessing their proportionate of the underlying 
assets of the partnership or may only do so at a discount to the fair market value 
of the underlying assets the Service argues that § 2703 applies. They argue that 
unless the partnership can meet the requirements of 2703(b), the terms of the 
partnership is to be ignored for valuation purposes and the value of the 
partnership interest is merely that partner's proportionate share of the 
underlying assets. 
Section 2703(b) provides that § 2703(a) shall not apply to any option 
agreement, right or restriction which meets three requirements: (1) it is a 
bonafide business arrangement, (2) it is not a device to transfer property to 
members of a decedent's family for less than full and adequate consideration or 
money's worth, and (3) its terms are comparable to similar arrangements 
entered into by person's in an arms-length transaction. The first two elements of 
2703(b) were merely codification of existing law. 
The third prong was added ostensibly to support the holding of St. Louis 
County Bank v. U.S., 647 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982). In most instances the 
taxpayer can never meet this third prong. The IRS claims that it is extremely 
unusual for taxpayers to transfer property into partnerships with unrelated 
parties in which their ability to sell, pledge, encumber or otherwise transfer the 
interest is absolutely prohibited. Nor do they believe that the vast majority of 
most agreements include a prohibition against the putting of a partnership 
interest back to the partnership. Even if such terms and provisions in 
partnership agreements exist in partnerships which are arms-length, the Service 
argues that such provisions are not similar arrangements. The Service states 
that in the context of the family partnership area, these partnerships contain the 
vast majority of the transferor's lifetime accumulation of assets and, thereby, 
the transferor irrevocably forfeits the exclusive rights to unilaterally decide to 
liquidate, exchange, gift presently received income and gains generated by the 
assets and to derive benefits from the present possession and enjoyment. The 
Service argues that persons who are not related do not transfer virtually all their 
wealth to a partnership under an agreement with unrelated parties that makes it 
impossible for them to reach those assets or the equivalent of those assets in 
money or money's worth. While people have been known to transfer a portion 
of their wealth to such investments with similar liquidation restrictions, nobody 
puts all of their wealth irrevocably under the control of unrelated persons. (I'm 
sure trusts companies would beg to differ.) The Service uses this as conclusive 
evidence that the taxpayer cannot meet the third prong of § 2703(b). 
The Service also argues that the taxpayer cannot meet the second prong; that 
the formation of the partnership is merely a device with which to transfer the 
value of the partnership's assets to the younger generation for less than full and 
adequate consideration. The Service cites declarations by taxpayers stating that 
one of the reasons for using a partnership is the fact that it makes it easy to 
begin making gifts to their children and grandchildren. Therefore, the formation 
of the partnership was a device from the beginning for the purpose of 
transferring the donor's wealth to their natural beneficiaries. This argument 
makes little sense. As discussed earlier, one of the attractive features of the 
limited partnership structure was that children and grandchildren would be 
obtaining a relatively illiquid asset which did not necessarily produce 
significant cashflow. Most donors are particularly concerned about spoiling 
younger family members with large gifts of cash or other liquid assets. 
Converting such assets into an illiquid form prior to gifting is obviously 
desirable. Moreover, the partnership format is far more desirable for gifting 
purposes than transfers of partial interests in real estate or other business assets. 
It is impractical and costly to make small transfers of real estate or other assets 
which must be rerecorded upon each successive transfer. 
In the event the Service loses under § 2703, it would then argue that § 2704 
would apply in most instances, preventing most of the discount in the valuation 
of partnership interests. Section 2704, in general, addresses perceived abuses 
related to the existence of lapsing rights which reduce the transfer tax value of a 
partnership interest and certain restrictions on the partnership's ability to 
liquidate. Section 2704(a) attempts to reverse the Harrison decision. If there is a 
lapse of any voting or liquidation right in a corporation or partnership and the 
individual holding such right immediately before the lapse and members of 
such individual's family hold both before and after the lapse control the entity, 
then the lapse of the right shall be treated as a transfer by gift or a transfer 
includable in the gross estate of the decedent, whichever is applicable. Thus, if 
a partner had the ability to liquidate all or part of his or her interest during life, 
and upon that partner's death their ability to liquidate any portion of the 
partnership interest of that partner diminished, a lapse would occur. Arguably, 
this reversed the result in Harrison. Section 2704(a) does not apply to the lapse 
of a liquidation right under certain circumstances. Specifically, under Treas. 
Reg. § 25.2704-1(c)(B), "whether an interest can be liquidated immediately 
after the lapse is determined under the state law applicable to the entity, as 
modified by the governing instrument of the entity, but without regard to any 
restriction described in 2704(b)." The regulations define a lapse of a voting 
right or liquidation right as follows: "a lapse of voting right or liquidation right 
occurs at the time the presently exercisable right is eliminated." Generally, a 
transfer of an interest that results in the lapse of a liquidation right is not treated 
as a lapse if the rights with respect to the transferred interest are not restricted 
or eliminated. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-1(c). Thus, the transfer of a minority 
interest in a corporation or partnership by the controlling shareholder or partner 
by definition is not a lapse of voting rights nor is it typically a lapse of 
liquidation rights as long as a general partnership interest is not being 
transferred and the transferor retains his ability to liquidate his remaining 
ownership interests. 
Section 2704(b) was meant to address abusive restrictions which resulted in the 
"excessive" discounting of lifetime transfers of interest in a corporation or a 
partnership. In general, it provides that to the extent there has been a transfer of 
an interest in a corporation or a partnership to a member of the transferor's 
family and the transferor and members of the transferor's family hold, both 
before and after the transfer, control of the entity, any applicable restriction 
may be disregarded in determining the value of the transferred interest. An 
applicable restriction is defined to mean "any restriction which limits the ability 
of a corporation or a partnership to liquidate and either lapses in whole or part 
after the transfer or could be removed in whole or part by the transferor or any 
member of the transferor's family acting either alone or collectively." Section 
2704(b)(2). The Service also interprets the definition of an applicable 
restriction to include restrictions on a partner's ability to transfer their interest 
either to the partnership or others. The term applicable restriction does not 
include any commercially reasonable restriction which arises as a part of any 
financing by the corporation or partnership with a person who is not related to 
the transferor or transferee or a member of the family of either, or to any 
restriction imposed or required to be imposed under federal or state law. Thus, 
in most jurisdictions in which the Uniform Limited Partnership Act serves as 
the model, the Service would take the position that in valuing a lifetime transfer 
of a limited partnership interest to a family member that any restriction on the 
partner's ability to put that interest back to the partnership is an applicable 
restriction and would be ignored for purposes of valuing that partnership 
interest for gift tax purposes. Most state laws provide that if the partnership 
agreement is silent concerning a partner's right to put their interest back to the 
partnership, that a partner has the right to put their interest to the partnership 
upon providing six months notice to that partnership. However, state laws vary 
as to partner rights. While a partner, under most states' law where the 
partnership agreement is silent, has a right to put their interest, it may only 
entitle the partner to an undivided interest in partnership assets or subject that 
partner to liability for damages caused to the partnership by exercising that 
right. Those corollary issues may justify significant valuation discounts even 
where a partner has the right to put their partnership interest. 
Should it lose both arguments under §§ 2703 and 2704, then the Service has the 
fallback position that either the formation of the partnership itself is a device to 
transfer wealth to family members at a discounted value and should be properly 
includable in the decedent's gross estate as occurred in Estate of Schauerhamer 
v. Comm., T.C.M. 1997-242, or, alternatively, there was a gift to the younger 
generation upon formation of the partnership to the extent that the older 
generation received partnership interests worth less than the assets they 
contributed, albeit proportionate in value to the partnership interests received 
by all partners. The Service would argue that under Schauerhamer as well 
as Estate of Murphy that transfers of partnership interests in close proximity to 
death may be includable in the gross estate under § 2036 if they are either 
poorly implemented and ignored as legal entities (as occurred in the case 
of Schauerhamer) or occur so close to death that the partnership is merely a 
device for discounting the value of the decedent's taxable estate as occurred in 
the Estate of Murphy. The Service's argument is that because the creation 
and/or transfer of the partnership coincides so closely with the date of the 
decedent's death that, for all practical purposes, the Service does not believe 
that the partnership was formed for any of the business purposes discussed 
earlier but was formed solely to reduce the ultimate transfer tax liability for the 
decedent. Accordingly, the Service asserts the assets should be included in the 
taxpayer's estate under § 2036. 
Using these multi-layered arguments, the Service has aggressively audited 
numerous taxpayer's gift tax returns and threatened litigation in many instances. 
Moreover, through the use of published and unpublished letter rulings, the 
Service has attempted to dissuade only the most versed and skilled planners 
from using family partnerships for their clients. The ultimate impact of these 
policies has been to confuse taxpayers of more moderate means and curtail the 
use of the limited partnership to those individuals with the more sophisticated 
advisors. This has the unfortunate consequence of limiting the many benefits of 
family partnerships to only those clients willing and financially able to contest 
the IRS which, we are sure, is not the true intent of either Congress or the 
Service. 
V. Rebuttal of the Service's Arguments Concerning Family Partnerships 
The Service's initial position that under § 2703 the provisions of a partnership 
agreement can be ignored for purposes of valuing the transfer of a partnership 
interest in a closely-held partnership cannot be supported using traditional 
statutory construction. The Senate report made it clear that the Chapter 14 did 
not change the fundamental principles under §§ 2031 or 2511 for determining 
fair market value. Specifically, that committee report stated "the bill does not 
affect minority discounts or other discounts available under present law…." It 
continued, "the bill does not affect the valuation of a gift of a partnership 
interest if all interests in the partnership share equally in all items of income, 
deductions, loss, and gain in the same proportion…." The Service may well 
argue that this language is contained in the portion of committee report that 
relates to § 2701 and, therefore, has no impact on § 2703. That, moreover, it 
should not be read out of context of the provision within which it is found. In 
general, we would agree. However, we would also note that the language 
quoted by the Service in support of their position is from the joint committee 
report related to restrictions covered in § 2704 and not § 2703 and, therefore, 
would have no relevance or bearing with regard to § 2703. Moreover, the 
language contained in the Senate committee report related to § 2703, which 
was not materially modified by the committee report, is titled "Buy/Sell" 
agreements. "The committee report discussing § 2703 then reads, "This bill 
provides that the value of property for transfer tax purposes is determined 
without regard to an option, agreement or other right to acquire or use the 
property at less than fair market value or any restriction on the right to sell or 
use such property, unless the option, agreement, right or restriction meet three 
requirements." It then discusses the three requirements which are a part of § 
2703. The committee reports dealing with this section conclude with the 
statement, "the bill does not otherwise alter the requirements for giving weight 
to a buy/sell agreement." For example, it leaves intact existing rules requiring 
that an agreement have lifetime applicability in order to be binding on death. It 
is clear that the committee report intends for § 2703 to address option 
agreements, traditional buy/sell agreements between family members, and 
similar agreements, and not partnership agreements. 
The committee report is careful to note that in the context of an option or a 
buy/sell right with respect to a partnership interest or an interest in a 
corporation, that such restrictions or rights could be imbedded in the various 
documents relating to the governing of the entity. If such provisions are 
contained in a partnership agreement, the partnership is not ignored but merely 
that clause of the partnership might be ignored. Nowhere in the context of the 
committee report can it be imagined that Congress through the enactment of § 
2703 intended to cause the existence of a partnership agreement to be 
disregarded for valuation purposes. Nor does it equate a partnership agreement 
to an option or buy/sell agreement. It is clear Congress intended § 2703 to 
clarify and reaffirm the reasoning of St. Louis County Bank and reject 
suggestions of other cases that the maintenance of family control standing 
alone assures the absence of a device to transfer wealth in the context of a 
traditional buy/sell agreement or variations thereon. Nothing more can be 
inferred. 
There is no discussion anywhere in the legislative history of § 2703 that it was 
intended to override any other provision of the Code and, in particular, Code § 
7701(a)(2). Code § 7701(a)(2) provides that for estate and gift tax purposes the 
term, partnership, includes "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture or other 
unincorporated organization through or by means of which any 
business, financial operation, operation, or venture is carried on, and which is 
not, within the meaning of this title, a trust, or estate or corporation; and the 
term 'partner' includes a member of such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, 
or organization." Thus, neither § 7701(a)(2) or, for that matter, § 2703, suggest 
that a validly formed partnership under state law should be ignored for gift or 
estate tax purposes. If the partnership is recognized as validly formed for 
transfer tax purposes, then the property with which § 2703(a) must be making 
reference to is the transferred partnership interest and not the underlying 
property of the partnership. No other statutory construction makes sense 
particularly in the context with which Chapter 14 was enacted. 
If through some perverse interpretation of the legislative history to § 2703 the 
courts determine § 2703 did indeed amend § 7701(a)(2), then for the 
partnership agreement not to be an agreement which restricts the owner's ability 
to acquire or use the underlying property at a price less than fair market value, 
the taxpayer must prove that the partnership agreement is (1) a bonafide 
business arrangement, (2) not a device to transfer property to members of the 
transferor's family for less than an adequate consideration, and (3) at the time 
the partnership is formed, the terms of the partnership are comparable to similar 
arrangements entered into by persons in an arms-length transaction. As long as 
the partners respect the terms of the partnership, then the partnership should 
meet the bonafide business arrangement requirement. As stated at the 
beginning of this paper, there are numerous sound business reasons for forming 
a partnership as well as the fact that it is clearly the most income tax efficient 
structure for owning an investment or business. It is even the default entity 
under § 7701(a)(2) and § 761 for situations when more than one legal entity 
join together to form another entity. Thus, under the Code there is a 
presumption that joint activities will be in the form of a partnership. Congress 
obviously intended that partnerships be widely used and recognized for tax 
purposes. 
Under the second prong to the exception to § 2703, entering into the 
partnership agreement by the transferor must be shown not to be a device to 
transfer the property he contributed to the partnership to a family member for 
less than full and adequate consideration. Thus, the taxpayer must prove that 
either the drafting of the partnership agreement is not a device for transferring 
wealth or that the transferor's family did not receive the full value of the 
underlying assets. The device test is not new and has been argued consistently 
by the Service under § 2031 in Estate of Bischoff v. Comm. 69 TC 32 (1977) as 
well as in Harrison v. Comm. and Estate of McClendon v. Comm., 66 TCM 
946 (1993). The Courts in each of these decisions determined that transfer 
restrictions contained in partnership interests are not, in and of themselves, 
devices artificially depressing the value of the transferred partnership interest. 
The device test is fundamentally a question of whether transfer tax savings was 
the primary motivation for forming the family partnership or were there other 
valid income tax and/or business purposes for forming the partnership which at 
least equal or exceed the transfer tax benefits of the partnership. 
The facts of St. Louis County Bank were extreme. The buy/sell agreement 
restrictions were ignored by the taxpayer's family with respect to lifetime 
transfers to family members. Moreover, the buy/sell formula in the St. Louis 
County Bank resulted in an unrealistic valuation of zero of the underlying asset. 
Such extreme valuation formulas cannot be considered a typical business 
arrangement. Unrealistically low valuation formulas create a strong implication 
that the buy/sell agreement is a device to transfer wealth to the decedent's 
family. With respect to most family partnerships, neither of these extreme sets 
of facts are present. The key lesson of the St. Louis County Bank's opinion was 
"the District Court concluded that the existence of a valid business purpose 
necessarily excluded the possibility that the agreement was a tax- avoidance 
testamentary device. We disagree. The fact of a valid business purpose could, 
in some circumstances, completely negate the alleged existence of a tax 
avoidance testamentary device as a matter of law, but those circumstances are 
not necessarily presented here." The extreme valuation formula created a clear 
implication in the Court's mind that the buy/sell agreement was a device to 
transfer wealth to the decedent's family. In a typical family partnership, that 
kind of fact pattern is simply not present. As long as the partnership remains in 
existence for some period of time following either the death of the decedent or 
transfer of the partnership interest, then the partnership agreement, in and of 
itself, should not be considered a device. The maintenance of partnership for an 
extended period of time supports the taxpayer's position that the partnership 
was formed for valid business purposes in addition to the favorable tax 
attributes. 
Although not needed, the second part of § 2703(b)(2) could also be met by 
most taxpayers. In most instances, what a transferee receives either through a 
lifetime transfer or through a taxpayer's estate is not a right of a limited partner 
or a general partner to receive the underlying asset value but is a right as an 
assignee to the partnership interest. An assignee does not automatically become 
a partner under most state law and most partnership agreements until the 
partners of the partnership expressly admit the assignee as a partner to the 
partnership. Typically, such admission can be withheld for any reason. Thus, it 
would be impossible for the Service to argue that the underlying asset value has 
been transferred to the transferor's family because all they received were the 
rights of an assignee in most instances. The value of those rights, in many 
cases, may be less than what the transferor had prior to the transfer. 
The final prong to the exception to § 2703 requires that the taxpayer show that 
the restrictions and terms of the partnership agreement are comparable to 
similar arrangements entered into by persons in an arms-length transaction. The 
regulations define a similar arrangement as one that could have been obtained 
in an arms-length among unrelated parties in the same business dealing with 
each other at arms-length. A right or restriction is considered a bargained for 
restriction if it conforms to the general practice of unrelated parties under 
negotiated agreements in the same business. Limitations on the ability of a 
transferee to automatically be admitted to a partnership are found in most 
partnership agreements and are the default provisions under most state laws. 
Moreover, limitations on a partner's ability to sell or redeem their partnership 
interest are not unusual any time multiple entities join together in a common 
endeavor. This is necessary to protect all partners from the costs of maintaining 
high levels of liquidity or the inopportune sale of illiquid assets. However, the 
trend in many states is to restrict the ability of a limited partner to put their 
interest as the default provision under state law. In those states it cannot be 
argued that restrictions prohibiting the exercise of such put rights are not 
typical or common. Even if such limitations were not deemed to be present in 
similar arrangements among unrelated parties, then the partnership agreement 
itself would not be ignored in its entirety but merely that clause of the 
partnership agreement. The property being transferred is still a partnership 
interest. To the extent that the partnership has other restrictions or limitations 
on a partner's ability to monetize their interest, those terms would still have a 
depressing impact on the value of that interest. The asset to which § 2703 is to 
apply, if at all, is still a partnership interest because economically and legally 
that is all that the recipient received. Its valuation at worst will be determined 
under the § 2703 modified partnership agreement. 
In any event, withdrawal rights and most other partner rights under most state 
laws are limited to limited partners and are not extended to assignees. Thus, the 
transferee in most instances would not have the right to put their interest under 
state law until they became a partner. As previously discussed, the right to 
become a partner is not mandated under state law and is problematic at best. In 
conclusion with respect to § 2703, it should not be construed as to apply to 
modify the definition of a partnership for transfer tax purposes under § 
7701(a)(2) but should be interpreted in the context of buy/sell arrangements 
and option agreements. Even if § 2703 were to be applied to every partnership 
agreement per se, most family partnerships should be able to meet the three 
pronged requirements under 2703(b) to be excepted from the application of § 
2703(a). 
The applicability of § 2704(a) and (b) is also not likely or appropriate. In the 
context of 2704, the issue is whether there has been a lapse of any liquidation 
or voting right held by the decedent. This arguably arises if the decedent holds 
either a limited partnership interest or both a general and limited partnership 
interest. As discussed previously, under most state laws the transferee of a 
general partnership interest or a limited partnership interest only receives the 
rights of an assignee and is not elevated to those of a partner absent the 
remaining partners consenting to the assignee being admitted to the partnership. 
Therefore, in the context of the death of a limited partner is there a lapse 
associated with that limited partnership interest which occurs when the 
successor of that limited partnership interest only has the rights of an assignee? 
Arguably, there has been some lapse but as a practical matter, there has been no 
lapse of any measurable value because under the willing buyer/willing seller 
test of Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), a third party hypothetical acquirer of such 
interest would realize that he was only obtaining the rights with respect to that 
partnership interest as an assignee and not as a limited partner. Therefore, the 
valuation of a typical limited partnership interest both before and after any 
transfer should not be materially different and should approximate the value of 
an assignee interest. Hence, no lapse in value occurs, merely due to a transfer 
even at death. 
In the context of the situation where the decedent has both a general and limited 
partnership interests, the issue is a little more complex. As previously noted, § 
2704(a) does not apply to a lapse of a liquidation right where the lapse would 
be disregarded under § 2704(b). Under Treas. Reg. 25.2704-1(c)(2)(b), 
"whether an interest can be liquidated immediately after the lapse is determined 
under the state law generally applicable to the entity, as modified by the 
governing instruments of the entity, but without regard to any restriction 
described in § 2704(b)." Thus, under most state laws, a limited partnership 
interest cannot be liquidated except as provided under state law and only 
assignee rights can be transferred. Most general partnership interests can be 
redeemed under state law by the partnership; however, that would not terminate 
the partnership unless the decedent was the sole general partner of the 
partnership. Thus, in most instances, § 2704(a) would once more have only 
limited applicability. It arguably would apply only to the extent a partner lost 
the ability to put their general partnership interest, but would still have no 
impact on the valuation of their limited partnership interest. 
With respect to most pro rata limited partnerships, § 2704(b)is not applicable to 
transfers of limited partnership interests to a family member for a number of 
reasons. First, an applicable restriction is defined under the Code to mean "any 
restriction (a) which limits the ability of the corporation or partnership to 
liquidate and (b) with respect to which either of the following applies, (1) the 
restriction lapses in whole or in part after the transfer of the interest or (2) the 
transferor or a member of the transferor's family either alone or collectively has 
the right to ask for the removal in whole or part of the restriction." § 
2704(b)(2). The Service takes the position that limitations on limited partners' 
ability to put their interest back to the partnership is a restriction under 2704(b) 
and should be ignored for valuation purposes. First of all, this is an invalid 
statutory interpretation. The Code's definition of an applicable restriction refers 
only to the corporation's or partnership's ability to liquidate. An application 
restriction, as defined in § 2704, has nothing to do with a shareholder's or 
partner's ability to sell their interest or have it redeemed by the entity. The fact 
that a partnership agreement may prohibit the putting of a partnership interest 
back to a partnership or the withdrawal of a partner has no bearing on the 
partnership's ability to liquidate. No other interpretation is possible based on 
the clear understanding of the statute. As stated earlier, the growing trend in 
many states is to change the applicable state partnership law to eliminate the 
right of any partner to put their interest back to the partnership. With respect to 
those states, which include Delaware, Georgia, California, Mississippi, New 
York, Missouri, Ohio, among others) § 2704(b) could never apply to 
restrictions on the ability of the partner to put their interest back to the 
partnership. Moreover, partnerships can be formed anywhere using the state 
law of another jurisdiction. Thus, arguably, given appropriate planning, 
2704(b) would never apply even if the Service's interpretation of the section is 
upheld. 
Even if a state's law does provide the right of a limited partner to put their 
interest and the Service's interpretation of 2704(b) is correct, ignoring the put 
provision with respect to the limited partnership interest should have no impact 
on the ultimate valuation of the limited partnership interest. That is because the 
transferee receives only the rights of an assignee and, under most state laws, an 
assignee has no right to sell their interest to the partnership. Thus, even if the 
partnership agreement was read so as not to limit the right of the limited partner 
to put their interest back to the partnership, the gift tax value of that partnership 
interest would still not vary significantly from that of an assignee interest 
regardless of whether § 2704(b) applied. This is further supported by the fact 
that even if the limited partner put their interest back to the partnership, they 
would only be entitled to receive "fair value" on their withdrawal. As discussed 
earlier, it would be unclear what fair value would be and what kind of 
consequential damages would occur due to a "unanticipated, premature" 
withdrawal by a limited partner from a partnership. Moreover, an assignee 
would never posses this right. Once more, it should also be noted that § 2704(b) 
does not contemplate the abolition of normal discounting principles. The 
conference committee report stated "these rules do not affect minority 
discounts or other discounts available under present law." If § 2704(b) were to 
apply potentially to any entity that did not have a perpetual life (i.e., all entities 
other than corporations) due to limited partner put rights, then that would 
completely denude the legislative history of its clear meaning. Section 2704(b) 
cannot be read in context to mean that it precludes the availability of normal 
discounts to partnerships but not to corporations. It is our understanding that 
under most state laws, shareholders possess no put rights with respect to their 
shares. Clearly, § 2704(b) was not intended to be applied in a manner which 
only impacts the value of partnership interests and not corporate stock. 
This leaves the Service with the less attractive arguments that the formation of 
a partnership itself was either a sham or a device under the principles 
of Schauerhamer and Murphy. As discussed previously, Estate of 
Bischoff, Estate of Harrison, and Estate of McClendon have all held that the 
family partnership structure does not violate the device test under the 
regulations under § 2031. Moreover, the Service has repeatedly ruled that the 
transfer of a limited partnership and retention of a general partnership interest 
does not violate IRS § 2036(a)(2) or § 2038 under the principles of United 
States v. Byrum, 408 US 125 (1972). Assuming the multiple purposes for the 
creation of the partnership can be adequately documented and supported, there 
should be no basis for asserting that the partnership is a device under § 2031. 
Obviously, the partnership would need to have more than a temporal existence 
and the terms of the partnership in its provisions would need to be respected. 
Otherwise, the taxpayer would run risks under either § § 2031 or 2036. 
However, in the typical partnership context, the partnership continues for a 
considerable period of time beyond its initial formation serving several valid 
purposes. In this normal fact pattern, the Service's arguments that the 
partnership is a device ring hollow. 
VI. Charting a Course Through Troubled Waters 
The Service's current attack on limited partnerships is merely a reflection of 
their unofficial denial of the existence of Rev. Rul. 93-12 or the principles 
espoused therein. However, their hope that Chapter 14 represented a legislative 
overturning of Rev. Rul. 93-12 is misplaced. Until the Service and Treasury are 
able to convince Congress to enact legislation contravening the principles of 
93-12 and the underlying case law which is the foundation for Rev. Rul. 93-12, 
the Service should abandon its policy of belligerence towards taxpayer's who 
have made transfers of closely-held limited partnership interests, and their 
rulings should treat discounts of such interests for transfer tax purposes in a 
more even-handed manner. 
In the meantime, taxpayers must make sure that the facts surrounding their use 
of the limited partnership structure do not warrant IRS challenge. The 
partnership must be entered into for valid business or investment purposes. 
Such purposes should be documented. Wherever possible, one partner should 
not be given the unilateral right to liquidate the partnership. Partnership 
agreements should be drafted using state laws where § 2704(b) is moot. Rights 
and powers of assignees should be no greater than those provided under state 
law. Wherever possible, there should be more than one general partner. And, 
finally, the transfer of a partnership interest should give the recipient only the 
rights of an assignee under state law. If these principles are followed and the 
partnership interest is not transient in existence, then there should be no valid 
grounds for the Service to challenge the discounts found when valuing the 
partnership interest in either a gift or estate tax context. 
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